The following is a list of errata contained in The World According to Kant, plus corrections, listed by page number. If you spot any others, and would not mind letting me know, I would be grateful. 

P. 83, footnote 158

The current text: "Each particular determination of an object belongs to a ‘determinable’ of the object. For example, the determination of my cat of currently weighing 8 kg belongs to the determinable of having some weight or other at every instant; his determination of currently being located on the highest platform of his favorite jungle gym belongs to the determinable of being located somewhere or other at every instant; and his determination of currently being asleep belongs to the determinable of being awake or asleep at every instant. Ontologically distinct kinds of objects differ with respect to their determinables. All appearances have the same determinables, but they have different determinables compared to things in themselves. For example, things in themselves are not in space and time, and so being located somewhere or other at every instant is not one of their determinables. ‘Determining’ an object consists in specifying a particular determination for one or more of its determinables; and a completely determined object is an object for all of whose determinables a particular determination has been specified. See B599–611/A571."

The footnote should be as follows: "Each particular determination of an object belongs to a ‘determinable’ of the object. For example, the determination of my cat of currently weighing 8 kg belongs to the determinable of having some weight or other at every instant, and his determination of currently being located on the highest platform of his favorite jungle gym belongs to the determinable of being located somewhere or other at every instant. Ontologically distinct kinds of objects differ with respect to their determinables. There are some basic determinables that all appearances have qua appearances but that no thing in itself has. For example, things in themselves are not in space and time, and so being located somewhere or other at every instant is not one of their basic determinables. ‘Determining’ an object consists in specifying a particular determination for one or more of its determinables; and a completely determined object is an object for all of whose determinables a particular determination has been specified. See B599–611/A571.

(Thanks to Ekin Erkan for a question that prompted the revision.)

P. 159, second sentence of section 3.5

The current text: "The lessons to be spelled out in this section are that the conception of empirical objects that two-aspect commentators ascribe to Kant is incompatible both with his empirical idealism and his empirical realism, in particular, his empirical realism about space and time."

The text should be as follows: "The lessons to be spelled out in this section are that the conception of empirical objects that two-aspect commentators ascribe to Kant is incompatible both with his transcendental idealism and his empirical realism, in particular, his empirical realism about space and time." 

(Thanks to Nicolás Silva for spotting this error.)

P. 232, second line from the top

The current text: "In the context of part (B) of the master argument, Kant is not entitled to assert (2i); and (2ii), although unobjectionable on its own, turns out to be insufficient to yield the desired justification for the key move of the second step of the transcendental exposition presently under discussion. Regarding (2i), while the (strong) mind-dependence of the determinable of being Euclidean of each empirical object can be identified as a necessary condition for the reference of the a priori intuition of space to this determinable, none of our foregoing considerations in the context of part (B) allow us to conclude that empirical objects are fully mind-dependent, let alone that they are ontologically specified by outer empirical intuitions (which, later on, they turn out not to be)."

The text should be as follows: "(2i) is false, and (2ii), although unobjectionable on its own, turns out to be insufficient to yield the desired justification for the key move of the second step of the transcendental exposition presently under discussion. Regarding (2i), the (strong) mind-dependence of the determinable of being Euclidean of each empirical object can be identified as a necessary condition for the reference of the a priori intuition of space to this determinable. Similarly, as we saw in section 4.1.1, the intermediary conclusion of the first step of part (B) of the master argument, that space is essentially an intentional object of an a priori intuition, if supplemented with Spacetime-containment and Spacetime-immersion, is sufficient for us to conclude that empirical objects are fully mind-dependent. But the claim that empirical objects are ontologically specified by outer empirical intuitions is not only unwarranted but false, as we learn later. Empirical objects are ontologically specified by experience, and experience, although based on empirical intuitions, is distinct from them."