The following is a list of errata contained in The World According to Kant, plus corrections, listed by page number. If you spot any others, and would not mind letting me know, I would be grateful.
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P.44
The current text: "The being of an entity E is mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has being, there is a finite mind M, and E has being, at least partly, in virtue of the fact that M has, or could have, a possibly complex representation whose presentational content includes E."
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The text should be as follows: "The being of an entity E is mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has being, there is a finite mind M, or a group of finite minds GM, and E has being, at least partly, in virtue of the fact that M, or the members of GM taken together, have, or could have, a possibly complex representation of E."
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(Thanks to Nick Stang for raising a question that made it clear to me that I should make explicit that the mind-dependent entity could depend on a group of minds, rather than an individual mind. Note that this is only one of two changes in the definition.)
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P.45
The current text: "A property P/and ontological ingredient OI of an entity E is mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has P/comprises OI, then there is a finite mind M, and E has P/comprises OI, at least partly, in virtue of the fact that M has, or could have, a possibly complex representation whose presentational content includes E having P/comprising OI."
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The text should be as follows: "A property P/and ontological ingredient OI of an entity E is mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has P/comprises OI, then there is a finite mind M, and E has P/comprises OI, at least partly, in virtue of the fact that M has, or could have, a possibly complex representation of E having P/comprising OI."
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P.47
The current text: "A property P/an ontological ingredient OI of an entity E is strongly mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has P/comprises OI, then there is a finite mind M, and E has P/comprises OI in virtue of the fact that M has, or could have, a possibly complex representation whose presentational content includes E having P/comprising O."
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The text should be as follows: "A property P/an ontological ingredient OI of an entity E is strongly mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has P/comprises OI, then there is a finite mind M, and E has P/comprises OI in virtue of the fact that M has, or could have, a possibly complex representation of E having P/comprising O."
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P.48
The current text: "The being of an entity E is strongly mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has being, there is a finite mind M, and E has being in virtue of the fact that M has, or could have, a possibly complex representation whose presentational content includes E."
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The text should be as follows: "The being of an entity E is strongly mind-dependent if, and only if, necessarily, if E has being, there is a finite mind M, or a group of finite minds GM, and E has being in virtue of the fact that M, or the members of GM taken together, have, or could have, a possibly complex representation of E.
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P.83, footnote 158
The current text: "Each particular determination of an object belongs to a ‘determinable’ of the object. For example, the determination of my cat of currently weighing 8 kg belongs to the determinable of having some weight or other at every instant; his determination of currently being located on the highest platform of his favorite jungle gym belongs to the determinable of being located somewhere or other at every instant; and his determination of currently being asleep belongs to the determinable of being awake or asleep at every instant. Ontologically distinct kinds of objects differ with respect to their determinables. All appearances have the same determinables, but they have different determinables compared to things in themselves. For example, things in themselves are not in space and time, and so being located somewhere or other at every instant is not one of their determinables. ‘Determining’ an object consists in specifying a particular determination for one or more of its determinables; and a completely determined object is an object for all of whose determinables a particular determination has been specified. See B599–611/A571."
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The footnote should be as follows: "Each particular determination of an object belongs to a ‘determinable’ of the object. For example, the determination of my cat of currently weighing 8 kg belongs to the determinable of having some weight or other at every instant, and his determination of currently being located on the highest platform of his favorite jungle gym belongs to the determinable of being located somewhere or other at every instant. Ontologically distinct kinds of objects differ with respect to their determinables. There are some basic determinables that all appearances have qua appearances but that no thing in itself has. For example, things in themselves are not in space and time, and so being located somewhere or other at every instant is not one of their basic determinables. ‘Determining’ an object consists in specifying a particular determination for one or more of its determinables; and a completely determined object is an object for all of whose determinables a particular determination has been specified. See B599–611/A571.
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(Thanks to Ekin Erkan for a question that prompted the revision.)
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P.159, second sentence of section 3.5
The current text: "The lessons to be spelled out in this section are that the conception of empirical objects that two-aspect commentators ascribe to Kant is incompatible both with his empirical idealism and his empirical realism, in particular, his empirical realism about space and time."
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The text should be as follows: "The lessons to be spelled out in this section are that the conception of empirical objects that two-aspect commentators ascribe to Kant is incompatible both with his transcendental idealism and his empirical realism, in particular, his empirical realism about space and time."
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(Thanks to Nicolás Silva for spotting this error.)
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P.207: There should be no quotation marks around the indented block quotations from the Logic.
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P.208
The current text: "...infinitely determinations must be specified..."
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The text should be as follows: "...infinitely many determinations must be specified..."
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P.219: There should be no opening quotation mark in front of the indented block quotation.
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P.232, second line from the top
The current text: "In the context of part (B) of the master argument, Kant is not entitled to assert (2i); and (2ii), although unobjectionable on its own, turns out to be insufficient to yield the desired justification for the key move of the second step of the transcendental exposition presently under discussion. Regarding (2i), while the (strong) mind-dependence of the determinable of being Euclidean of each empirical object can be identified as a necessary condition for the reference of the a priori intuition of space to this determinable, none of our foregoing considerations in the context of part (B) allow us to conclude that empirical objects are fully mind-dependent, let alone that they are ontologically specified by outer empirical intuitions (which, later on, they turn out not to be)."
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The text should be as follows: "(2i) is false, and (2ii), although unobjectionable on its own, turns out to be insufficient to yield the desired justification for the key move of the second step of the transcendental exposition presently under discussion. Regarding (2i), the (strong) mind-dependence of the determinable of being Euclidean of each empirical object can be identified as a necessary condition for the reference of the a priori intuition of space to this determinable. Similarly, as we saw in section 4.1.1, the intermediary conclusion of the first step of part (B) of the master argument, that space is essentially an intentional object of an a priori intuition, if supplemented with Spacetime-containment and Spacetime-immersion, is sufficient for us to conclude that empirical objects are fully mind-dependent. But the claim that empirical objects are ontologically specified by outer empirical intuitions is not only unwarranted but false, as we learn later. Empirical objects are ontologically specified by experience, and experience, although based on empirical intuitions, is distinct from them."
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